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Abstract- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric 
key encryption algorithm which is extensively used in secure 
electronic data transmission. When introduced, although it was 
tested and declared as secure, in 2005, a researcher named 
Bernstein claimed that it is vulnerable to side channel attacks. 
The cache-based timing attack is the type of side channel attack 
demonstrated by Bernstein, which uses the timing variation in 
cache hits and misses. This kind of attacks can be prevented by 
masking the actual timing information from the attacker. Such 
masking can be performed by altering the original AES software 
implementation while preserving its semantics. This paper 
presents possible software implementation level 
countermeasures against Bernstein’s cache timing attack. Two 
simple software based countermeasures based on the concept of 
“constant-encryption-time” were demonstrated against the 
remote cache timing attack with positive outcomes, in which we 
establish a secured environment for the AES encryption. 
 
Index Terms—Advanced Encryption Standard, Cache Timing 
Attack, Constant time encryption, Side Channel Attack  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the modern world, symmetric key cryptography 
possesses a high esteem where it provides secure 
communication in the presence of unauthorized third parties. 
In computerized information systems, symmetric key 
cryptosystems are used to provide confidentiality for sensitive 
messages by encrypting them into messages that make no 
sense to third parties. Symmetric key cryptosystems are 
equipped with two public algorithms known as the encryption 
algorithm and the decryption algorithm. Encrypting is an 
invertible mathematical operation performed on the sensitive 
message with the aid of a public encryption algorithm and a 
secret-key which is shared amongst authorized parties.  
When the encrypted message comes to an authorized 
person who has the knowledge of the secret-key, she/he can 
invert the encrypted message with the aid of a public 
decryption algorithm and the secret-key to get the meaningful 
sensitive message.  
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Semantically, it is assumed that an unauthorized person 
cannot learn any useful information about the sensitive 
message by seeing the encrypted message even though both 
the encryption and the decryption algorithms are public.  
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is such a 
symmetric key cryptosystem, which has been adopted by 
United States National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST). This was developed by Belgian cryptographers, John 
Daemon and Vincent Rijmen and originally called Rijndael; 
and was chosen as a replacement for the Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) after finding it was less secure [1]. 
AES is established on a design principle recognized as a 
substitution permutation network, and is fast for 
implementation both in hardware and software. 
AES is a symmetric block cipher with a block size of 128 
bits (16 bytes) and comprises one of the three key lengths of 
128, 192, or 256 bits, which use 10, 12 and 14 rounds 
respectively. Each round except the last, involves four stages: 
Sub Bytes, Shift Rows, Mix Columns and Add round key. 
AES formats plaintext in to 16-byte blocks, and then treats 
each block as a 4x4 state array. For each operation, AES 
implementation uses pre-computed tables of values. 
Therefore, time consumed for each operation depends on 
those table lookups; hence the vulnerability to side channel 
attacks is increased. 
A Side Channel Attack (SCA) is any attack based on “side 
channel information”, the information which can be gained 
from encryption device, which we cannot consider as the 
plaintext to be encrypted or the cipher text that results from 
the encryption procedure. It is not an attack based on 
theoretical weakness of the algorithm but of the 
implementation. Attackers use information leaking from the 
system such as timing information, electromagnetic beats and 
sometimes it can be even a sound [2]. 
Using cache timing information as the side channel, cache 
timing attacks are performed by analysing leaking timing 
information when a crypto system is performing encryption. 
Cache, which is a component that is used by the central 
processing unit of a computer, reduces the average time to 
access memory and store data providing a faster access for 
future needs. The data stored in the cache can be the value 
accessed recently or the duplicate of original values that are 
stored somewhere else in the computer [3]. 
When a particular data is requested, if it is stored in the 
cache, this request can be assisted by merely reading the 
cache (aka. cache hit) and it will be much faster compared to 
the data to be recomputed or drawn from its original storage 
location (aka. cache miss) [4]. 
In AES implementation, pre-computed tables or the S-
boxes are stored as arrays and since the cache memory has 
limited space, they cannot be fully loaded in to the cache 
memory. The program accesses these array entries while the 
encryption is done, and in these instances, cache hits or 
misses can occur, leading to a significant timing variation, 
hence leaking timing information for any attackers trying to 
break the system. 
In 2005, Bernstein revealed a remote cache timing attack 
against AES and showed that AES is susceptible for timing 
attacks [5]. In our study, we follow his proposed attack as our 
guide, where we have analysed and implemented it in our 
environment and we have created some countermeasures and 
have assessed their performance and reliability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents related work. In Section III, we have described our 
implementation of Bernstein‟s attack. Section IV is on 
countermeasures against Bernstein‟s attack where we have 
tested two implementation level countermeasures by 
enforcing constant number of clock cycles for encryption of a 
data packet. We could practically demonstrate the success of 
proposed countermeasures by showing the attacker‟s inability 
to find the actual secret-key. Further, we have appraised the 
efficiency of our suggested countermeasures comparatively 
with the efficiency of unmasked AES implementation. In 
section V, we have included the performance influence of our 
explored countermeasures. In Section VI we have concluded 
the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Bernstein performed his attack successfully by using the 
OpenSSL 0.9.7a AES implementation on an 850MHz 
Pentium III Desktop Computer, running FreeBSD-4.8 as a 
network server. He extracted the complete AES key using a 
client machine and pointed out that the same technique can be 
performed on more complicated servers with additional 
timing information. He has also tested an AMD Athlon, an 
Intel Pentium III, an IBM PowerPC RS64 IV and a Sun 
UltraSPARC III processor with positive results. 
In the meantime, Kocher has performed timing attacks on 
implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS and other 
crypto systems [6]. He stated that timing attacks are centred 
on measuring the time it takes for a unit to perform 
operations, where it lead to information about secret keys and 
break the crypto system. He also stated that the attack is 
computationally not much difficult and most of the time only 
known cipher text is required and he has presented some 
techniques for preventing the attacks. 
Felten et al. [7] have done timing attacks on web privacy. 
They have described a class of attacks that can compromise 
the privacy of user‟s web-browsing histories. The attacks 
permit a malicious web site to collect information on users‟ 
browsing activities. By assessing the time the user‟s browser 
requires to perform certain operations it can be determined. 
According to them, the time required for operations depends 
on the user‟s browsing history and this time variations bear 
enough information to contain user‟s privacy because of the 
various forms of caching performed by browsers. According 
to them these attacks can be carried out without the victim‟s 
knowledge. They pointed out that simple countermeasures 
cannot prevent these types of attacks. Therefore they have 
proposed a way of re-creating browsers. 
In 2011, Alawatugoda et al. [8] have performed a research 
on countermeasures against remote cache timing attacks by 
planning and implementing few possible countermeasures. In 
order to prevent cache timing attacks, they have followed the 
approach of masking leaking timing information. They have 
added several code fragments in to the AES implementation. 
They have been able to do it without changing its semantics 
and also without severely reducing the competence of it. The 
software based countermeasures they have tested involve 
adding randomness and few actions on T-tables such as pre-
fetching table values and cache partitioning where cache 
locations are allocated to load T-tables. They have been able 
to achieve the target successfully.  
In 2012, Jayasinghe et al. have presented constant time 
encryption as a countermeasure against remote cache timing 
attacks [9]. Most of the software based countermeasures are 
vulnerable to statistical analysis though they are flexible and 
easily organized. With that problem in mind, they have tested 
a countermeasure that is safe against statistical analysis. Their 
method reschedules the instructions of AES algorithm where 
the encryption rounds will consume constant time regardless 
of the cache hits and misses. They have done so in major 
three steps which are decomposing the code into smaller 
bitwise operations, adding each and every bitwise instruction 
sets to queues and processing each queue. They have shown 
that the countermeasures have eliminated the side channel 
vulnerability. 
In this paper, we have focused on masking timing 
information by constant time implementations where AES 
encryption program is rescheduled to take a constant time 
execution regardless of cache hits and misses. Bernstein has 
proposed several countermeasures which are related to the 
constant time approach and also the practical problems of 
them. According to Paul Kocher, for masking timing 
information constant time approach is an approved working 
method and he focused on Diffie-Hellman, RSA and DSS 
systems. Alawatugoda et al. has proposed few different 
methods other than constant time encryption as 
countermeasures e.g. random or specified „for‟ loops, pre-
fetching T-table values and cache partitioning. Jayasinghe et 
al. has proposed to use pipeline depth of the targeted 
processor to make timing details constant. We have tried a 
different, much simpler approach than those mentioned above 
by considering number of clock cycles and it proved to be 
successful as well as efficient against cache-timing attacks. In 
this paper, we are presenting the performance, soundness and 
effectiveness of our work. 
III. BERNSTEIN‟S CACHE TIMING ATTACK 
Our initial cryptographic system was established according 
to Bernstein‟s work [5]. He has successfully extracted the 
complete AES key from a network. Two identical servers are 
used where one is the actual victim‟s server and the other is a 
duplicate identical to the victim‟s server. The server program 
is compiled on a 733MHz Pentium III Desktop Computer 
running FreeBSD and the Client is a 2.0 GHz Intel Core i3 
laptop machine running Ubuntu 10.10. Client sends random 
data packets to the server for encryption and the time for 
encrypting the packets are recorded. Server encrypt those data 
packets using a private key and sends back the information of 
encryption time with scrambled zeros to Client. Server avoids 
sending any encrypted data to the client which acts as the 
attacker.  
The attack has three stages. Initially client collects data 
under a known key. Secondly it collects data for the unknown 
key. Both data are saved in separate files. As the final step the 
key is deduced by correlating the two obtained files and it 
will produce the possible key space according to the timing 
details.  
Fig. 1 shows the sample key possibilities obtained after 
correlating is done. The illustrated key space is approximately 
3.9x10
10 
as opposed to 3.4x10
38
 which is the original key 
space of 128 bits AES.  
In Fig. 1 the number of possible keys for each byte and the 
byte number are shown in first and second columns 
respectively and the possible keys are shown by the rest. AES 
key bytes are highlighted. 
A brute-force search is done in order to find the AES key 
from the extracted possible keys. Each possible key is 
checked against the server‟s scrambled zeros by encrypting 0s 
with it and checking whether it is equal with the scrambled 
zeros. This is done until the search program finds the full 
AES key.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Following an idea from Alawatugoda‟s paper [8], we 
experimented on search time for various sizes of key 
combinations so that we could derive some important 
conclusions when the reduced key combinations are attained 
from timing attacks. The experiments were done using a 
2.0GHz Intel Core i3 processor which also acted as our 
„Client‟ in the attack tested. Results are reported in Table 1. 
And the Fig. 2 shows the graph drawn from the values of 
Table 1. 
TABLE I 
SEARCH TIME FOR DIFFERENT KEY POSSIBILITIES 
Possible AES key 
space 
Time taken (s) 
101 2x10-3 
102 3x10-3 
103 4x10-3 
104 1.2x10-2 
105 4.3x10-2 
106 5.1x10-2 
107 2.95x10-1 
108 2.82 
109 28.10 
1010 281.49 ~ 5 minutes 
1011 2804.75 ~ 47 minutes 
1012 18600.58 ~ 5 hours 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. COUNTERMEASURES 
In the literature, there have been many countermeasures 
proposed and tested. Mainly these can be divided as software 
based and hardware based countermeasures. In this research, 
we have focused on a software approach. In order to protect 
implementations of secret-key cryptographic primitives there 
are only limited choice of countermeasures. Those are to 
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8  2  6c 68 6a 6f 6b 6d 6e 69 
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8 14  5f 5b 5d 5c 5a 59 58 5e 
Fig. 1. Sample key spaces after correlation 
Fig. 2. Graph of key space vs. Search time in seconds 
either masking of information or randomization of operations. 
We concentrated on masking timing information where it is 
tried to achieve by constant time encryption and tested two 
approaches. Detailed explanations of the methods are given 
below. 
 
A. Fixed number of clock cycles 
 
The AES software implementation is rescheduled such that 
it will take constant time for execution. Algorithm 1 shows 
the part of the code executed for the first round inside 
AES_encrypt function in AES implementation. Initially a 
fixed number is defined (line 1). By using a time stamp, 
number of clock cycles for each round is obtained (lines 2-7). 
Then the difference between the two is obtained (line 8). That 
is, the fixed number and the number of clock cycles for each 
round. Then, a loop is included where it runs from zero to the 
number that is obtained (line 9). This is done for each and 
every 16 rounds.  
 
1. static int fixed_cycles= 250;  //a fixed number of clock cycles 
2. int j=0; 
3. int startT[THE_SIZE];  //the start of the timestamp 
4. static int num_cycles[THE_SIZE]; //array for number of clock cycles 
5. int cyc_diff[THE_SIZE] 
/* round 1: */ 
 
6. startT[0] = timestamp1();  
 
  ……round 1 AES implementations…… 
 
7. num_cycles[0] = timestamp1() - startT[0];  
8. cyc_diff[0] = fixed_cycles - num_cycles[0]; 
  
9. for(j=0; j< cyc_diff[0]; j++) 
  { 
   asm("nop"); 
  } 
 
 
Fixed number method has taken around 5630 additional 
clock cycles than the usual. That is, it takes around 5050 
clock cycles for original AES implementation when 
calculating the average number of cycles for encryption of 
800 byte packets whereas this changed AES execution 
consume around 10700 clock cycles. We observed that it is 
approximately 2.1 times higher than the number of clock 
cycles in the unprotected AES implementation. 
In addition, it was detected that some of the key bytes are 
missing after the usage of this modified AES implementation. 
The attacker will be unable to recognize the authentic timing 
pattern properly because of the incorrect timing information. 
And also it was observed that the total number of possible 
keys is nearly 9.4 x 10
35
. That is a considerably larger value 
when comparing with the original AES implementation 
which contained around 3.9 x 10
10 
possible keys when 
attacked. Fig. 3 shows the results marked in the graph of key 
space vs. search time in seconds. Time estimated from the 
graph is 5.5x10
19 
years. That is, with the attack program 
tested in this research it will be impossible to find the correct 
key within reasonable amount of time.   
Above mentioned results are obtained when the fixed 
number was set to 250. It is possible to create 
countermeasures with different levels of protection by 
increasing or decreasing the fixed number. As a test search 
the fixed number was increased to 2500 and it was observed 
that altered AES implementation costs about 87220 clock 
cycles. It is a very large overhead compared with the 
unprotected implementation and it was 17.27 times higher in 
number of clock cycles. And the possible number of keys 
obtained was 1.1x10
37
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Average number of clock cycles 
 
Instead of defining a fixed number of clock cycles by an 
outsider (the programmer that is), numbers of clock cycles for 
rounds themselves are used to calculate an average and to 
perform constant encryption time by equalling clock cycles 
up to the averaged value. Algorithm 2 shows the code 
fragment implemented for the fifth round inside AES_encrypt 
function in AES implementation. 
Initially by defining a time stamp, number of clock cycles 
for each round is obtained (lines 1-7). Then the average is 
calculated incrementally for each round (lines 8, 9 and 10). In 
between each round a 'for' loop is included where it execute 
from zero to the number that is obtained as the difference of 
averaged value and the clock cycle value of the particular 
round (line 11). 
Since there are 16 rounds in AES algorithm, code fragment 
in Algorithm 2 runs 16 times, incrementally calculating 
average for each round when encrypting data packet.  
The operation of making the encryption time constant 
using an averaged value of clock cycles has taken around 
1000 more clock cycles than the usual. That is it takes around 
5050 clock cycles for original AES implementation when 
determining the regular number of cycles for encryption of 
800 byte packets whereas this altered AES costs about 6050 
clock cycles. We observed that it is approximately 1.19 times 
Algorithm 1.  Fixed number method 
Fig. 3. Result of the fixed number method 
greater than the number of clock cycles in the unprotected 
AES implementation. 
 
1. int startT[THE_SIZE];  //the start of the timestamp 
2. static int num_cycles[THE_SIZE]; //array for number of clock cycles 
3. static int Cycle_avg[THE_SIZE]; //the average of clock cycles 
4. int cyc_diff[THE_SIZE]; //the difference between average and a 
clock cycle 
5.int sum = 0; 
 
/* round 5: */  
 
6. startT[4] = timestamp1(); 
 
 ……..round 5 AES implementations…….. 
 
7. num_cycles[4] = timestamp1() - startT[4];  
8. sum = sum + num_cycles[4]; 
9. Cycle_avg[4] = sum/5; 
10. cyc_diff[4] = Cycle_avg[4] - num_cycles[4]; 
 
11.for(j=0; j< cyc_diff[4]; j++) 
{ 
 asm("nop"); 
                } 
 
  
After using our AES implementation in the server we 
noticed that some of the key bytes have been missing. The 
attack has been unable to recognize the authentic timing 
pattern properly because of the wrong timing information. 
The total number of possible keys is nearly 2.1 x 10
38
. That is 
a considerably larger value when comparing with the original 
AES implementation which contained around 3.9 x 10
10 
possible keys. Fig. 4 shows the result marked in the graph key 
space vs. search time. According to the graph the estimated 
time to find the key is 1.2 x 10
22 
years. That is, it will be 
impossible to find the correct key even with the attack tested. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
Missing a key byte can cause difficulties for an attacker to 
find the secret key, because even if a key byte is missed and 
the position of it is known to the attacker, he will have to 
execute a search on 256 times larger key space. Thus it is 
hard to perform it. Further, it becomes much harder if the 
invader does not know the location of the missing key byte. 
When few key bytes are missed the key space will be greater 
in some power (number of bytes missing) of 256. Hence if a 
countermeasure can slip even one key byte the protection of 
the AES implementation increases considerably. 
In this research, the intention was to create simple and 
effective countermeasures based on the concept of constant 
encryption time. To achieve that target two different 
approaches were tested. The two countermeasures have 
shown varying amounts of overheads. It might directly affect 
the competence of the AES implementation. To decide which 
one is better, we can evaluate outcomes of missing key byte 
or the number of clock cycles compared to the original 
unprotected AES implementation.  
Table II shows the performance evidence of each 
countermeasure 
TABLE II 
PERFORMANCE OF TESTED COUNTERMEASURES 
 
Countermeasure 
No. of 
missing 
key 
bytes 
(m) 
Avg. no. of 
clock cycles 
per 
encryption 
No. of 
multiples from 
the original 
AES 
implementation 
(s)( original 
val. = 5050) 
Fixed number 3 10680 2.10 
Average number 2 6050 1.19 
 
Using the information given in Table II, Equation (1) is 
proposed in [8] to calculate competence of the 
countermeasures tried. We can get an assessment about the 
effectiveness of the countermeasures. In the equation (1), m 
indicates the number of missing values and the multiple value 
comparing with the original AES implementation is given by 
s (or is X times higher than the unprotected AES). 
                                                                                                    
                                                                                          
When the efficiency values of tested countermeasures were 
calculated using the equation (1), the following results were 
obtained. 
Efficiency (Fixed number) = 1.42 
Efficiency (Average number) = 1.68 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this research two simple countermeasures based on the 
concept of constant encryption time were planned and 
executed against the remote cache timing attack which was 
suggested by Daniel Bernstein. The efficiencies were 
Algorithm 2.  Average number method 
Efficiency=
1
s
m (1) 
 
Fig. 4. Result of the average number method 
calculated using equation (1) by comparing the 
countermeasures.  
According to the research the most effective and efficient 
countermeasure amongst proposed two countermeasures is 
using an average number of clock cycles in order to make the 
time constant. In both approaches we can see the number of 
missing bytes are very close; not a very significant difference 
but in fixed number approach consumes a large amount of 
CPU clock cycles and therefore the AES implementation 
becomes slower. Average number approach can be 
considered as the most fine-tuned version of fixed number 
approach because in average number approach it is tried to fix 
the number of clock cycles for encryption to the most 
optimum value using the average number of clock cycles of 
encryptions so far. 
Finally, we conclude that enforcing constant number of 
clock cycles is a working countermeasure against cache-
timing attacks on AES implementations. 
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